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Abstract
Highly pathogenic avian influenza virus (HPAI) strain H5N1 has had direct and indirect economic impacts arising
from direct mortality and control programmes in over 50 countries reporting poultry outbreaks. HPAI H5N1 is now
reported as the most widespread and expensive zoonotic disease recorded and continues to pose a global health
threat. The aim of this research was to assess the potential of utilising Hazard Analysis of Critical Control Points
(HACCP) assessments in providing a framework for a rapid response to emerging infectious disease outbreaks. This
novel approach applies a scientific process, widely used in food production systems, to assess risks related to a
specific emerging health threat within a known zoonotic disease hotspot. We conducted a HACCP assessment for
HPAI viruses within Vietnam’s domestic poultry trade and relate our findings to the existing literature. Our HACCP
assessment identified poultry flock isolation, transportation, slaughter, preparation and consumption as critical control
points for Vietnam’s domestic poultry trade. Introduction of the preventative measures highlighted through this
HACCP evaluation would reduce the risks posed by HPAI viruses and pressure on the national economy. We
conclude that this HACCP assessment provides compelling evidence for the future potential that HACCP analyses
could play in initiating a rapid response to emerging infectious diseases.
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Introduction
Since 1980, on average one new emerging infectious
disease (EID) has appeared in humans every eight months [1]
with the emergence of these pathogenic infectious diseases
representing a substantial global threat to human health [2,3].
Research has found that of all EIDs, 60.3% are zoonoses
originating in wildlife and these represent the most significant
global health threat [4–6]. Examples of key recent EID
outbreaks include Ebola haemorrhagic fever [5,7], SARS
coronavirus [8], highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) and
most recently, avian influenza A H7N9 [9].
Since late 2003, highly pathogenic avian influenza virus
(HPAI) strain H5N1 has been responsible for the deaths of
millions of animals, primarily poultry taxa but also a range of
other avian and mammalian species [9,10]. HPAI H5N1 has
been reported in poultry from over 50 countries with 375
human deaths among 630 confirmed cases (59. 5 % confirmed
case fatality risk) recorded in 12 of these countries as of 30
June 2013 [9,11]. The countries of Southeast Asia have been
hardest hit by HPAI H5N1 with 2681 reported outbreaks in
domestic poultry in Vietnam alone by 30 June 2013. In the first
five months of 2013, 15 human fatalities have occurred in the
20 cases of HPAI H5N1 so far been reported in Cambodia,
China and Egypt [11].
Approximately 80% of the Vietnamese population live in rural
areas and almost 80% of these rural households participate in
small-scale (backyard) poultry production [12]. The Red River
and Mekong River deltas are major poultry producing areas
from which poultry and their products (e.g. eggs, faeces,
feathers) may be transported directly to the point of sale by the
breeder or pass through a number of middle-men in the trade
chain.
HPAI H5N1 spread rapidly from Southeast Asia into Europe
and Africa. The main mechanism for HPAI spread is the
movement of poultry and their products [13,14] however the
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modes of poultry-to-human transmission of this virus remain
poorly understood [15]. Live poultry markets are acknowledged
as a reservoir for the virus within the Southeast Asia region
[14,16].
Here we take a technique, Hazard Analysis of Critical Control
Points (HACCP) analysis [17] and apply it to HPAI viruses
within Vietnam’s poultry trade system to explore the role that
this approach may have in catalysing efforts to tackle emerging
infectious disease outbreaks. We identify the key stages within
the poultry trade chain which pose risks for the transmission of
HPAI viruses in human and poultry populations. We then
discuss the potential use of HACCP assessments as a rapid
response tool during the early stages of emerging infectious
disease outbreaks, as a precursor to more time-consuming
quantitative data collection and biomedical testing.
Methods
The HACCP assessment of Vietnam’s domestic poultry trade
followed the first three HACCP principles (described in Table 1)
to address our aims [17]. The initial flow chart created during
the first stage of the HACCP assessment (see Figure 1) was
developed based on our long-term research of Vietnam’s
poultry trade. The flow chart begins with a poultry egg and
tracks all the possible routes that this egg could take through
Vietnam’s domestic poultry trade. This flow chart was then
presented to a range of experts for critical analysis; including
public health professionals, epidemiologists and wildlife
disease biologists. A hazard was considered to be a process
within Vietnam’s poultry trade providing an opportunity, at an
unacceptable level of risk, for the transmission of HPAI either
from poultry-to-human or poultry-to-poultry. Based on the
frequency with which these hazards occur, they were then
grouped into categories of posing a high or low-risk to poultry
and/or humans.
Following the validation of the flow chart, we referred to the
team of experts again to determine appropriate Critical Control
Points (CCPs). A CCP is a point in poultry trade which provides
an opportunity to control, prevent or eliminate the risks for
HPAI transmission. Each of these first two principles required
Table 1. The first three principles of a Hazard Analysis of
Critical Control Points
 Aims Actions
Principle 1
Outline key ‘risk’ stages in
system under
investigation.
Conduct hazard analysis. Create flow
chart of stages involved within the
system in question and validate the flow
chart through liaison with experts.
Principle 2
Identify Critical Control
Points (CCPs) within the
system
Critical review of the system to highlight
stages which can adopt mitigation
strategies for hazards known to occur
frequently.
Principle 3
Develop CCPs and control
recommendations for the
recognised hazards
Ascertain critical limits for the CCPs
identified and use these to generate
recommendations for the improvement
of the overall system.
cross-referencing outputs with existing literature on HPAI virus
epidemiology within Vietnam’s poultry trade. We also referred
to recent reviews of the scientific literature to identify any risks
which the HACCP analysis failed to identify.
Critical limits were then set for each of the CCPs identified.
These critical limits are thresholds used as preventative
measures to control the hazards within the system. Setting the
critical limits required prior research of both Vietnam’s domestic
poultry trade and consumer behaviour.
Results
Hazard Analysis
The stages of the poultry trade chain identified as presenting
increased opportunities for HPAI transmission in the HACCP
were grouped into four categories, namely: 1. contact within
poultry flocks, 2. poultry transportation and sale, 3. poultry
purchase and slaughter, and 4. poultry preparation and
consumption.
1 Contact within poultry flocks occurs at multiple stages within
the trade. These potential viral ‘mixing pots’ exist when i)
established flocks mix with newly recruited birds purchased by
the owner; ii) flocks mix at a market; iii) birds mix at communal
HPAI H5N1 vaccinations centres and iv) fighting cock contests
bring birds together in one contact arena. Each of these
scenarios present high-risk opportunities for poultry to poultry
transmission whereas scenarios i), iii) and iv) also present
high-risk opportunities for poultry-to-human transmission.
2 Poultry may experience multiple transportation events across
a large spatial scale throughout their lifetime. At all stages of
the poultry trade, the transportation and sale of eggs, chicks,
adult birds or poultry products, creates opportunities for
human-mediated transmission of HPAI viruses. Due to the
contact opportunities and volume of birds moved across
various spatial scales, the transportation and sale of poultry is
considered a high-risk activity for HPAI transmission from both
poultry-to-poultry as well as poultry-to-humans.
3 The purchase and slaughtering of poultry from wet markets
primarily occurs in one of two ways; i) purchase from wet
markets can involve the consumer buying a live bird which they
then take home to slaughter themselves or ii) they can request
the poultry seller to slaughter and prepare a chosen bird which
the consumer then takes home as joints of raw meat. Both of
these modes of purchase are closely linked to the fourth risk
category, described further below. Purchase of poultry via
mode i) is an HPAI transmission risk to poultry if the consumer
has other household poultry and a risk to the consumer
themselves when they come to slaughter and prepare the bird
at home. The purchase of poultry via mode ii) is an HPAI
transmission risk for the poultry seller as they slaughter and
prepare the bird at the market and the handling of raw meat is
a transmission risk for the consumer.
4 The preparation of poultry for consumption introduces
poultry–to-human HPAI transmission risks in the later stages of
the trade chain, primarily through the slaughtering process. In
the absence of appropriate hygiene practices, poultry
slaughtering and carcass preparation put the slaughterer at
HACCP and EID Rapid Response: HPAI H5N1
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Figure 1.  Flow chart used during the Hazard Analysis of Critical Control Points assessment conducted for the domestic
poultry trade within Vietnam.  
doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0072279.g001
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substantial risk of exposure to HPAI viruses due to the contact
with raw poultry and blood.
Poultry consumption (of meat, eggs, organs and blood from
both chickens and ducks) is a high-risk activity for HPAI
transmission from poultry-to-humans if the infection is
maintained in the raw or under-cooked tissue. Contrastingly,
the consumption of well-cooked poultry and poultry products
pose low-risks for viral transmission.
Critical Control Points and Critical Limits
CCPs were defined for each of the four risk stages identified
during the HACCP assessment of Vietnam’s poultry trade.
Each CCP is a point in the poultry trade which provides HPAI
viruses with an opportunity for transmission between host
animals. For each CCP, critical limits have been proposed to
limit virus transmission risks from poultry-to-poultry and from
poultry-to-humans (Table 2).
The CCPs for limiting transmission through contact within
poultry flocks involve the same approach as those for the
transportation and sale of poultry; a combination of flock
isolation, whereby established poultry flocks are prevented
from mixing with other birds; quarantining newly purchased
birds, where the newly purchased birds are held in isolation
from other birds for a minimum of seven days; and household
vaccination programmes (Table 2).
CCPs for the transportation and sale of the poultry begin
once they depart from their household of origin. The suggested
critical limit for this transmission risk is a total ban on inter-flock
mixing of birds throughout poultry transportation and sale.
Preparing poultry for human consumption is the first stage of
the trade chain when non-farmers are introduced to a high-risk
opportunity to contract HPAI viruses. Two key CCPs concern
poultry slaughtering and carcass preparation; this refers to the
slaughter of poultry both at home and in the wet markets.
The associated risks can be reduced through the correct use
of protective equipment such as face masks, gloves and sterile
utensils to prevent contact with raw and bloody poultry. Further
intervention should include the provision of additional education
to the population through a range of health promotion
mechanisms (including social media) as to how to handle
potentially infectious meat to hygiene standards imposed as a
feature of standard food preparation HACCPs in the retail food
industry.
Poultry consumption is not a substantial risk for poultry-to-
human HPAI transmission provided poultry products are well-
cooked, thus the cooking stage is the CCP for poultry
consumption with a critical limit of cooking temperature and
duration. Consuming raw blood pudding poses some of the
highest risks for poultry-to-human transmission of HPAI viruses
and controlling this risk is only possible through thorough
cooking practices or abstinence.
Discussion
Our HACCP assessment has identified poultry flock isolation
as well as the transportation, slaughter, preparation and
consumption of poultry as critical control points for HPAI H5N1
transmission in Vietnam’s domestic poultry trade. Critical limits
at each of these control points are recommended to control the
risks of HPAI transmission from poultry-to-poultry and from
poultry-to-humans.
The scope of Vietnam’s poultry trade is far-reaching both
geographically and across social classes. Rural Vietnamese
households typically keep a few backyard poultry and are likely
to consume these birds or birds from neighbouring flocks. In
urban Vietnamese households, it is less common for poultry to
be kept within the household and birds are typically purchased
at local markets [18]. Typically, the live poultry trade is
dominated by birds sold with no animal health certification and
which have been produced under questionable hygiene
conditions.
Poultry provides an important source of income as well as a
low-cost protein source for many rural Vietnamese households
[18]. The HPAI H5N1 epidemic has been both a public health
Table 2. Risk stages, critical control points and proposed
critical limits identified through HACCP assessments for
highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H5N1
transmission via Vietnam’s poultry trade.
Risk Stage Critical Control Point Critical Limits
1.Contact within poultry flocks   
i) Newly recruited birds introduced
into established flocks
Introduction of
‘foreign’ birds to an
established flockp
Flock vaccination
ii) Awaiting sale at market Arrival at marketp
Flock isolation,
quarantine newly-
purchased birds
iii) Awaiting transport back to
household
Arrival/preparation for
departurep
Flock isolation,
quarantine
iv) Communal poultry vaccination
centres
Throughout
vaccinationp,h
Flock isolation,
quarantine
v) Fighting cock contests Throughout contestp,h Isolation of birds,quarantine
2.Poultry transportation & sale   
Transportation of live birds Transfer fromhouseholdp
Flock isolation
throughout
Transportation of fighting cocks
post-bout Transfer post-fight
p,h Isolation
3.Poultry purchase & slaughter   
Slaughter of birds
Carcass disposalh,
poultry slaughter,
collection of bloodh
Use protective
equipment, follow
protocols, avoid
direct contact
4. Poultry preparation &
consumption   
Consumption of under-cooked
meat and eggs Cooking
h Cook thoroughly
Contact with raw meat Poultry preparationh
Use protective
equipment, follow
hygiene protocols,
avoid direct contact
p denotes the Critical Control Point (CCP) is intended to reduce the opportunity for
poultry-to-poultry HPAI transmission, h denotes the CCP is intended to reduce the
opportunity for poultry-to-human HPAI transmission.
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and an economic problem for many Vietnamese people
particularly the rural poor when pre-emptive culling has been
one of key interventions against H5N1.
If the management of infectious zoonotic diseases is to be
successfully implemented, controlling the transmission chain
from infected to uninfected animals is essential [13]. Pathogen
spread between rural poultry flocks may occur when these mix
or birds are moved within live markets, communal vaccination
centres or during transportation and fighting cock contests [19].
Incubation periods differ between chickens and ducks with
reports of deaths occurring within one to five days for chickens
and up to seven days for ducks [20]. As a result, at all stages,
flocks which have mixed with other poultry flocks should
undergo a week-long quarantine period, after which,
asymptomatic birds can be released. It has been noted that
transmission of HPAI H5N1 between poultry appears to have
shifted from the faecal/oral route towards the respiratory route
[13] which underlines the risks of mixing poultry flocks.
Poultry and its products are often transported in considerable
numbers across large spatial scales. During transportation,
HPAI material may be shed by infected individuals and lead to
other poultry coming into contact with viral material.
Consultation of published literature has shown that exposure to
an environment contaminated with viral material (for example
via soil, fomites, feathers, water etc.) can also pose a risk for
viral transmission [21–23]. The mixing and movement of poultry
through ‘wet’ markets (those selling live animals) is known to
play an important role in the transmission and spread of HPAI
viruses [16,24]. It has been reported that exposure to live
poultry at wet markets increases human/ HPAI H5N1 exposure
four-fold [25]. Within some wet bird markets such as those in
Hong Kong, current successful control programmes for HPAI
viruses incorporate ‘rest days’ whereby the markets are closed
and poultry stalls cleaned [16]. Implementation of such a
practice is recommended in Vietnam’s cities.
The H5N1 virus can survive in poultry carcasses kept at
room temperature for several days or longer at cooler
temperatures [26]. Human infection with the H5N1 virus is
associated with recent exposure to live poultry [25], direct
contact with dead poultry [27] and the preparation or cooking of
sick or dead poultry [28–30]. As a result, poultry market
workers and poultry slaughterers are at particular risk of human
HPAI H5N1 infection [24].
Within Vietnamese households it is typical to consume the
meat, eggs and organs of both chickens and ducks. The
consumption of chicken and chicken products varies from that
of ducks with regard to the parts consumed [31]. Uncooked
duck blood is commonly consumed for special occasions, a
practice that has been implicated in poultry to human HPAI
transmission [21,28].
Exposure to hazards iii) and iv) will depend on the
vaccination system employed and the suitability of the birds for
cock-fighting. In some communes the Department of Animal
Health (DAH) organises door-to-door vaccinations by local
veterinarians. In more remote villages, the DAH organises
communal vaccination days where households from several
villages bring their poultry to one centralised location for
vaccination. This latter vaccination system encourages the
mixing of poultry flocks from different localities, promoting
contact within poultry flocks, and given the time-lag before the
HPAI H5N1 vaccine becomes effective, presents a high risk for
the transmission of HPAI viruses. Door-to-door vaccinations
ensure a lower risk of inter-flock viral transmission and are
recommended. Should this approach prove impractical, the
isolation of flocks whilst at the communal vaccination centre
would limit the chances of inter-flock viral transmission. It is
also noted that vaccination programmes are currently lacking
any system of coordinated monitoring [13] which would reduce
virus spread.
Fighting cock contests may play a role in the transmission of
HPAI viruses to humans [14,28]. Fighting cocks are valuable
possessions and owners may transport birds large distances to
participate in bouts and even lick the wounds sustained by their
fighting cocks [32]. This practice likely aids the geographic
spread of HPAI viruses and is a risky activity for poultry to
human HPAI transmission [9].
Although not highlighted by this HACCP analysis, the review
of existing literature also identified the care of poultry as a risk
factor for HPAI H5N1 viral transmission from poultry to humans
[22].
Introducing the preventative measures highlighted by this
HACCP evaluation should reduce the occurrence of HPAI
outbreaks. The parallel findings of our rapid HACCP
assessment with the existing literature cited, provides strong
evidence for the potential that HACCP analyses may have as a
framework for helping local personnel to formulate a rapid
response to an emerging health threat. Indeed, because the
involvement of local personnel is a critical aspect of the
HACCP process, we would argue that the process not only
identifies key critical control points and suggests control
strategies but provides those local personnel with the
knowledge, understanding and ownership to more reliably
implement any identified control measures.
Scope for further application of the HACCP framework
The HACCP framework enables the identification of risks
within a system and the design of control methods. It does not
contain the scope for monitoring or ensuring compliance of the
control points identified; such control should be applied via
other means. Given that EIDs are appearing with increasing
frequency, often in countries where they place additional strain
on already over-burdened public health and healthcare
systems, being able to rapidly identify and design strategies for
control has valuable application in responding to emerging
health threats such as the Middle East Respiratory Syndrome
(MERS) virus which first appeared in Saudi Arabia in late 2012
[33] or the rapidly spreading outbreak of a novel avian
influenza A H7H9 in China since March 2013 [34]. Conducting
detailed, timely and comprehensive field investigations into
HPAI H5N1 outbreaks is hampered by the majority of cases
occurring in developing countries [35]. Advantages to such a
framework are that it requires minimal resources and can be
implemented by local health officials and international
expertise, if required, can be provided remotely. It also
complements recently developed diagnostic statistical models
for known pathogens [36]. Subsequent detailed and time-
HACCP and EID Rapid Response: HPAI H5N1
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consuming experimental analyses can then be conducted if
required. Whereas in-depth epidemiological studies can take
weeks or months to produce results and recommendations the
HACCP framework may provide a means of producing a
response within days of an outbreak occurring.
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